University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Law - Papers (Archive)

Faculty of Business and Law

1-1-2005

Cooperative Mechanisms and Maritime Security in Areas of Overlapping
Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction
Clive Schofield
University of Wollongong, clives@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Schofield, Clive: Cooperative Mechanisms and Maritime Security in Areas of Overlapping Claims to
Maritime Jurisdiction 2005, 99-115.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/261

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Cooperative Mechanisms and Maritime Security in Areas of Overlapping Claims
to Maritime Jurisdiction
Abstract
This chapter outlines progress in the delimitation of maritime boundaries and some of the problems
relating to overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction. It is contended that the incomplete nature of the
maritime political map of the world is problematic, in particular because lack of delimitation inevitably
equates to jurisdictional uncertainty and this is highly likely to be detrimental to maritime security.
Alternatives to maritime boundary delimitation - cooperative mechanisms in areas of overlapping
jurisdiction - are then addressed, including their emerging applicability to maritime security issues as well
as the Southeast Asian experience.

Keywords
Cooperative, Mechanisms, Maritime, Security, Areas, Overlapping, Claims, Maritime, Jurisdiction

Disciplines
Law

Publication Details
Schofield, C. H. (2005). Cooperative Mechanisms and Maritime Security in Areas of Overlapping Claims to
Maritime Jurisdiction. In P. Cozens & J. Mossop (Eds.), Capacity building for maritime security
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific : a selection of papers presented at the CSCAP Study Group Meeting on
Maritime Security Cooperation, December 2004, Kunming, China and April 2005, Delhi, India (pp. 99-115).
Wellington, New Zealand: Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand.

This book chapter is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/261

COOPERATIVE MECHANISMS AND
MARITIME SECURITY IN AREAS OF
OVERLAPPING CLAIMS TO
MARITIME JURISDICTION
Clive Schofield
Introduction
This chapter outlines progress in the delimitation of maritime
boundaries and some of the problems relating to overlapping claims to
maritime jurisdiction. It is contended that the incomplete nature of the
maritime political map of the world is problematic, in particular because
lack of delimitation inevitably equates to jurisdictional uncertainty and
this is highly likely to be detrimental to maritime security. Alternatives
to maritime boundary delimitation - cooperative mechanisms in areas
of overlapping jurisdiction - are then addressed, including their
emerging applicability to maritime security issues as well as the
Southeast Asian experience.

Progress Maritime Boundary Delimitation
The mosaic of international maritime boundaries around the world's
oceans is profoundly incomplete. The need for such boundaries is
longstanding but has increased markedly in step with the tremendous
increase in the maritime space coming under the jurisdiction of coastal
states in the post-World War II period. Indeed, it has been calculated
that as much as 44.5% of the oceans could be subject to some national
claim to maritime jurisdiction were every coastal state to claim a full
200 nautical mile (nm) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and advance
claims to extended continental shelf jurisdiction beyond 200nm where
applicable.1

1 J.R.V. Prescott and C.H. Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2005), chapters 2 and 10.
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As a consequence of the significant spatial extension of coastal state
claims offshore, particularly as a consequence of the enthusiastic
adoption of 200nm EEZ claims around the world, there has been a
proliferation in the number of potential maritime boundaries worldwide.
Inevitably a profusion of overlapping jurisdictional claims and offshore
boundary disputes have also emerged as states seek to secure the
maximum maritime entitlements for themselves. The international law
rules governing the delimitation of maritime boundaries laid down in
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) provide
only minimalist guidance as to how such disputes may be resolved,
particularly in respect of the broad resource-oriented national zones of
sovereign rights, the continental shelf and EEZ.
While Article 15 dealing with the delimitation of the territorial sea
favours equidistance as a method of delimitation, unless the States
concerned agree otherwise or there exists an "historic title or other special
circumstances" in the area to be delimited, this is not the case for the
continental shelf and EEZ.2 For the EEZ and continental shelf, LOSC
Articles 74 and 83 respectively use the same general language, calling
for agreement to be reached on the basis of international law in order to
achieve "an equitable solution".3 No preferred method of delimitation
is indicated and thus the LOSC's 'rules', if one can term them that, on
delimitation are open to wildly conflicting interpretation. Additionally,
sovereignty disputes, especially over islands, have complicated matters
and made a number of conflicting claims to maritime space extremely
hard to resolve.
Of an estimated 427 potential maritime boundaries around the
world, only about 168 (39%) have been formally agreed. Many of these
have been settled only partially, that is, the settlement is incomplete in
terms of boundary length and/or functionally in respect of the maritime

2 The Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) (United Nations, New York, 1983), Article
15.
3 Ibid., Articles 74 and 83.
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zones delimited, for instance seabed only but not water column.4 In terms
of the number and complexity of overlapping jurisdictional and
sovereignty claims, Southeast Asian waters are perhaps the most
disputed regional seas the world over. These claims are complicated by
the presence of territorial disputes over islands and have been
exacerbated by increasing concerns over securing maritime resources,
especially oil and gas. Less than half of the potential maritime boundaries
in Southeast Asia have been even partially resolved, leaving substantial
zones of overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction. Is this a problem
and why should the resolution of, or at least management of, these
competing claims be a priority?

The Purpose and Value of Maritime Boundaries
It can be contended that the delimitation of maritime boundaries
provides clarity and certainty to all maritime states and users, helps to
minimise the risk of friction and conflict by eliminating a source of biand multilateral dispute and removes barriers to cooperation, thus
enhancing the potential for cooperative maritime enforcement and
enhanced maritime security. Greater compliance with international
obligations with respect to jurisdiction, security and freedom of
navigation can have direct and tangible benefits to the states involved
as well as other maritime users. The facilitation of common approaches
to maritime jurisdiction and legislation can thus lead to enhanced

4 Prescott and Schofield, Maritime Political Boundaries, chapter 10. Based on US Department
of State figures updated by the author. See, United States Department of State, 'Maritime
Boundaries of the World', Limits in the Seas, No. 108 (Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Washington D.C., 1988). This analysis was allied to
the review of agreements contained in the International Maritime Boundaries series. This
figure excludes the seven potential boundaries of the Caspian Sea, which for this analysis
are not considered to be maritime boundaries, as well as potential 'boundaries' between
coastal states and the International Sea Bed Authority concerning the outer limit of the
continental shelf. Additionally, multiple delimitations relating to the same maritime
boundary situation are excluded as are internal delimitations such as those amongst the
Emirates that now make up the UAE. See J.I. Chamey and L.M. Alexander (eds.),
International Maritime Boundaries, vols. I and II (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1993); J.I.
Chamey and L.M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, vol. Ill, (Martinus
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1998); J.I. Chamey and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime
Boundaries, vol. IV (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2002); and R.W. Smith and D. Colson,
(eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, vol. V (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2005).
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economic security. Additionally, maritime delimitation can also facilitate
the sustainable management and preservation of important ocean
resources.
Conversely, lack of delimitation often equates to extensive
overlapping claims to jurisdiction and this situation tends to exacerbate
management problems. Within such contested zones, access to seabed
resources potentially crucial to the well-being and political stability of
the coastal states involved is prevented. Similarly, with regard to
significant living resources, competing claims can lead to -uncoordinated
policies and potentially destructive and unsustainable competition and
friction between rival states which have the potential to escalate into
political and even military confrontation.
Furthermore, overlapping claims undermine maritime security as
the LOSC, and coastal states themselves, tends to favour exclusively
national maritime enforcement measures, in spite of the way in which
the marine environment transcends national maritime claims and
boundaries.5 It can be argued that overlapping claims areas represent
potential lacunae in maritime enforcement as, where jurisdiction is
contested, it follows that surveillance and enforcement will remain
similarly uncertain, or at least ill coordinated.
Maritime boundary delimitation can therefore be viewed as
essential to the full realisation of maritime security, the peaceful
management of ocean resources and regional peace and prosperity. It is
for these reasons that CSCAP has repeatedly argued in favour of the
delimitation of maritime boundaries and resolution of maritime
jurisdictional disputes, for example:

Maritime Boundary Delimitation
Boundary delimitation between opposite and/or adjacent
States would assist cooperation to achieve law and order at
sea. Regional States should move expeditiously to resolve
existing boundary disputes to ensure that jurisdiction might
properly be exercised in applicable zones. If boundaries
cannot be resolved, economies should be prepared to enter
5 B.H. Oxman, 'Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations', in Chamey and
Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, vol. 1,2-40, at p. 4.
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into some form of provisional arrangements for the
maintenance of law and order in the disputed area without
prejudice to their positions in the boundary negotiations.6

Alternatives to Delimitation
Although maritime boundaries are the dominant means of governing
and defining national claims to maritime jurisdiction and are clearly
the type of management regime favoured by coastal states, it is clear
that many overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction, especially those
involving sovereignty disputes over islands of which there are numerous
examples in the Asia-Pacific region, are likely to be extremely hard to
resolve in the foreseeable future. In this context it is therefore worth
considering alternatives to the delimitation of international boundaries
and the adoption of cooperative mechanisms providing for shared rather
than unilateral management of maritime space. The principle form of
cooperative mechanism to emerge in the maritime context in recent years
is maritime joint development zones.
The legal rationale for joint development is provided by LOSC
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) dealing with the delimitation of the exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf respectively. These articles state,
in identical terms, that:
Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the
States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and
cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this
transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching
of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without
prejudice to the final delimitation,7
Joint development zones have attracted considerable enthusiasm from
commentators as a means of overcoming seemingly intractable maritime
boundary disputes. Where the parties concerned appear to be deadlocked
and there appears to be little prospect of agreement on a boundary line
in the foreseeable future, it has been argued that joint development
6 CSCAP Memorandum No.8.
7 UNCLOS, Articles 74(3) and 83(3).
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agreements seem to offer an ideal way forward, placing the focus
squarely on "a fair division of the resources at stake, rather than on the
determination of an artificial line".8
According to their advocates, maritime joint development affords
the parties concerned the opportunity to retain their claims whilst
simultaneously pushing forward with the development or management
of the resources or environment involved without undue delay. The
existence of 'without prejudice' clauses in this context provides an
effective means by which sovereignty concerns can be sidestepped and
legal concerns over compromising jurisdictional claims can be
addressed. A good example of this type of clause is Article 4 dealing
with the non-renunciation of claims in the Nigeria and Sao Tome and
Principe treaty establishing a joint zone between them of 2001:
4.1 Nothing contained in this Treaty shall be interpreted as
a renunciation of any right or claim relating to the whole or
any part of the Zone by either State Party or as recognition
of the other State Party's position with regard to any right
or claim to the Zone or any part thereof.
4.2 No act or activities taking place as a consequence of this
Treaty or its operation, and no law operating in the zone by
virtue of this Treaty, may be relied on as a basis for
asserting, supporting or denying tire position of either State
Party with regard to rights or claims over the Zone or any
part thereof.9

8 E.L. Richardson, 'Jan Mayen in Perspective', American Journal ofInternational Law, 82
(1988), 443-458. See also S.P. Jagota, 'Maritime Boundary and Joint Development Zones:
Emerging Trends', Ocean Yearbook, 10 (1993) 110-131; K. Lagoni, 'Interim Measures Pending
Maritime Delimitation Agreements', American Journal of International Law, 78 (1984), 345-368;
D. Ong, 'Southeast Asian State Practice on the Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas
Deposits', in Blake et al. (eds.), The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources (Graham
and Trotman, London, 1995), 77-96; and M. Miyoshi, 'The Joint Development of Offshore
Oil and Gas in Relation to Maritime Boundary Delimitation', Maritime Briefing, 2,, 5,
(International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham, 1999).
9 'Treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao
Tome' and 'Principe on the Joint Development of Petroleum and other Resources, in
respect of Areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the two States', (21 February 2001),
Article 4 . For treaty text see; <www.un.org/Depts/los/legislationandtreaties.htm>
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In fact, these provisions are based on the British Institute of International
and Comparative Law's (BIICL) pioneering work on drawing up a 'model'
joint development agreement. The inclusion of the BIICL's draft
provisions in a formal treaty establishing a joint zone represents a
welcome and encouraging example of an academic or 'track-two' process
having a clear impact on policy-making in the real world.10
Entering into a joint development arrangement can also be viewed
as a cooperative approach rather than the potentially confrontational
quest for a geographically precise and legally final and binding
traditional boundary line. As a result cooperative mechanisms can be
viewed as a means of conflict prevention and, ideally, as a form of
confidence building mechanism. It has been observed that:
Such arrangements enable States to make use of the
disputed areas and to conduct normal relations there. In
the absence of such arrangements, State may feel compelled
at some cost, to forcefully challenge each other's actions in
the area to maintain their legal rights.11
The delimitation of a boundary line also raises concerns that the
resources at stake may end up on the 'wrong' side of the line. This is
often a consideration where seabed energy resources are at stake as the
precise location of reserves is frequently not known until exploration
starts in earnest and test wells are drilled. Joint development removes
the need to define a boundary line and thus circumvents this problem removing it as a potential deterrent to agreement.12
The alternate view is that it seems inappropriate to promote joint
development simply on the basis that the contending parties to a dispute
over overlapping maritime claims have proved unable to resolve their
differences. It can also be argued that if joint zones are based on the
10 H. Fox (ed.), Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas (British Institute of International
and Comparative Law, London, 1989).
11 J.I. Chamey, 'Progress in International Maritime Delimitation Law7, American Journal of
International Lazo, 88 (1994), 227.
12 C.H. Schofield, 'Joint Development Zones: Constructive Solution or Complication?', in
Ocean Management Related toMaritime Zones, Proceedings of Regional Symposium on
Maritime Boundary Delimitation of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (St.
Lucia, July 1996) 60-80.
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limits of such overlapping claims areas, as tends to be the case, then
this serves to encourage and reward extreme unilateral maritime claims.
Furthermore, the practical task of establishing and maintaining such
potentially dauntingly complex arrangements should not be
underestimated as this requires considerable political commitment from
all parties as they do represent a significant challenge to state
sovereignty. Indeed, it has been stated that:
The conclusion of any joint development arrangement, in
the absence of the appropriate level of consent between the
parties, is merely redrafting the problem and possibly
complicating it further.13
In this context it is also reasonable to observe that if seabed resources
are at stake, as is often the case, development of those resources is likely
to take decades to realise. International oil companies demand political,
legal and financial certainty before they make the multi-million dollar
commitments that are required to pursue hydrocarbon exploration
operations. Continuity is therefore a requirement which means that any
cooperative mechanism must be founded on a strong bilateral political
relationship and thus be able to survive a change in government in one
or both states concerned.
These concerns are exacerbated by sensitivities over security
cooperation. The parties may harbour fears over intelligence gathering
by the 'other' side in the joint zone. This reinforces the point that political
will remains a crucial factor in joint zones, just as it is in the realisation
and subsequent management of a maritime boundary agreement.
Nevertheless, it is clear that emerging state practice appears to
favour joint development arrangements and that such arrangements are
in line with international law, including the LOSC. Joint development
arrangements therefore do offer a flexible and practical way forward
13 W.G. Stormont and I. Townsend-Gault, 'Offshore Petroleum Joint Development
Arrangements: Functional Instrument? Compromise? Obligation?', in Blake et al. (eds.)
The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources, (Graham and Trotman, London, 1995),
52. Similarly, Jagota has noted that "sensitive security conditions in the area,
incompatible political relations between the disputants, vertical or dependent economic
relations, reluctance to transfer technology or to co develop [sic] technology, and other
similar inconsistencies may generate resistance to joint development zones, with or
without a maritime boundary." ('Maritime Boundary and Joint Development Zones',
117).
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for states with seemingly intractable disputes over overlapping maritime
claims with their neighbours. Furthermore, a number of precedents exist,
including in the Southeast Asian and East Asian regional context.

Cooperative Mechanisms in Southeast Asia
Southeast and East Asia boasts considerable experience in terms of
cooperative mechanisms and maritime joint development zones. The
region hosts two joint zones which have been established in addition to
the delimitation of a maritime boundary. These are the agreement
concluded between Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) in 1978
concerning the Torres Strait14 and China and Vietnam straddling their
maritime boundary agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Gulf to
China) of 25 December 2000.15 The former agreement is of particular
note as it is complex and creative and provides an excellent example of a
cooperative mechanism that, unlike many, is not focussed on seabed
resources. The Torres Strait agreement was especially innovative in that
within the protected zone, established with the aim of guarding
traditional fishing activities and regulating the exploitation of
commercial fisheries, separate continental shelf and fisheries
boundaries were delimited. This feature of the agreement, coupled with
its detailed regulatory regime addressed the 'problem' of existence of
several Australian islands located near to the PNG coast and thus on
the 'wrong' side of the median line between the two states' mainland
coastlines. As a result of the dual boundary approach, these islands fall
on the Australian side of the fisheries boundary but the PNG side of the
continental shelf jurisdiction line.16 The Gulf of Tonkin agreement relates
14 'Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea
Concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the Two
Countries, including the Area Known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters', (18 December
1978, entry into force 15 February 1985). For treaty text, see <www.un.org/DeptsAos/
legislationandtreaties.htm>.
15 Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Viet
Nam on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, the Exclusive Economic Zone and
Continental Shelf in Beibu Bay/Gulf of Tonkin (25 December 2000). For treaty text, see
<www.un.org/DeptsAosAegislationandtreaties.htm>
16 C.FI. Schofield and M.A. Pratt, 'Cooperation in the Absence of Maritime Boundary
Agreements: The Purpose and Value of Joint Development', in The Aegean Sea 2000,
Proceedings of International Symposium on the Aegean Sea (Bodrum, Turkey, 5-7 May,
2000), 152-164.
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to joint fisheries activities and was vital to securing agreement on
delimitation of the two states' maritime boundary in that area.
Several other arrangements have also been established in the
absence of maritime delimitation. These include the long-standing joint
zone between Japan and South Korea in the East China Sea which was
concluded in 1974. This agreement represents a classic example of a
joint zone concerned with enabling seabed exploration activities to
proceed where deadlock had been reached on continental shelf boundary
negotiations.17 The Gulf of Thailand also hosts two fully-fledged
cooperative arrangements, both concerned with seabed resources,
between Malaysia and Thailand of 197918 and between Malaysia and
Vietnam of 1992.19 The contrast between these two arrangements is
stark. The Thai-Malaysian agreement is institutionally complex and took
over 10 years to implement as a consequence of disputes over previously
granted concessions as well as faltering political will.20 In contrast, the
Malaysia-Vietnam agreement avoids regime-building in favour of a
simple, practical arrangement facilitating resource exploitation through
cooperation between the two states' national oil companies. In both cases
costs and revenues are to be shared equally.21 Another joint arrangement
within the Gulf of Thailand is that between Cambodia and Vietnam
dating from 1972. This is a somewhat peculiar arrangement, dealing as
it does with joint historic waters located within the two states' straight
baseline claims. The joint development mosaic in the Gulf of Thailand
also appears set to become yet more complex as Cambodia and Thailand
17 Miyoshi, 'The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas', 12-14.
18 Memorandum of Understanding between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia on
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Boundary between the Two Countries in the
Gulf of Thailand (24 October 1979, entry into force 15 July 1982). For treaty text, see
<www.un.org/Depts/Ios/legislationandtreaties.htm>
19 Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam for the Exploration and Exploitation of Petroleum in a Defined Area of the
Continental Shelf Involving the Two Countries (5 June 1992, entry into force 4 June 1993).
20 Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and (he Government of the
Kingdom of Thailand on the Constitution and Other Matters Relating to the
Establishment of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority (30 May 1990); Miyoshi, 'The
Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas', 14-17. See also, Ong, 'Southeast Asian State
Practice'.
21 Miyoshi, 'The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas', 21.
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signed a Memorandum of Understanding in June 2001. This accord
commits them to delimitation in the northern part (above 11° N. latitude)
of their large area of overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand, coupled
with the establishment of a joint development zone to the south, although
no formal agreement has yet been forthcoming.
Perhaps the most sophisticated maritime joint development zone
developed around the world was the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation
between Australia and Indonesia established through a Treaty signed
in December 1989 with additional detailed regulations being added in
1991. Covering an area of 60,500 km2the Timor Gap arrangement was
divided into three sub zones. The initial duration of the agreement was
40 years, to be followed by successive terms of 20 years. The agreement
became defunct, however, with Timor Leste's (East Timor) independence.
The Timor Gap was a complex yet also highly innovative and
comprehensive maritime joint development zone and many
commentators have suggested that it represents a 'model' for joint
development elsewhere around the world.22
On independence East Timor maintained that it was not bound by
any of the agreements related to East Timor's territory entered into by
Jakarta - including the Timor Gap joint development zone. A
breakthrough was made in 2002, however, when an interim arrangement,
termed the Timor Sea Treaty (TST), was signed.23 The TST established
a Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) which encompasses the
central part of the old Australia-Indonesia joint zone. Unlike the other
joint zones mentioned, sharing of revenues within the JPDA is unequal
with East Timor set to receive a 90% share of government revenues
therein. The TST entered into force in April 2003, allowing production
of natural gas from the Baya-Undan field located within the JPDA from
February 2004.24

22 Fox, Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas; and Miyoshi, 'The Joint Development of
Offshore Oil and Gas', 17-20.
23 'Timor Sea Treaty' (Dili, 20 May 2002, entry into force 2 April 2003). For treaty text,
see <www.un.org/DeptsAos/legislationandtreaties.htm>
24 C.H. Schofield, 'Dividing the Resources of the Timor Sea: A Matter of Life and Death
for East Timor', Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27(2) (August 2005), 255-280.
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Additionally, a number of joint fisheries agreements have been
established in East Asia. These include ones between China and Japan
in the East China Sea of 11 November 1997, Japan and South Korea in
the East China Sea and Sea of Japan (East Sea to Korea) of January 2000
and China and South Korea in the Yellow Sea of 30 June 2001.25 These
agreements emerged as a result of all three States ratifying the LOSC
and claiming EEZs in 1996, resulting in overlapping entitlements and a
renewed need for either maritime boundary delimitation or a mechanism
to deal with their overlapping claims until such boundary agreements
are put in place.
Together these agreements represent a significant step forward in
cooperative management of shared resources and the establishment of
a conflict avoidance architecture. All three agreements share the virtue
that they are based on the LOSC regime, having stemmed from each
state's EEZ claims. They are also based on shared interests and
recognition of their mutual, functional requirement for cooperation in
order to conserve and manage fisheries resources that are under severe
pressure. Perhaps most significantly, the joint arrangements have helped
to stabilise bilateral fisheries relations and reduce conflicts. The
agreements also have the potential to act as confidence-building
mechanisms in the longer term as bilateral contacts and relationships
are being deepened through the establishment of joint institutions such
as Joint Fisheries Committees. These cooperative mechanisms relating
to fisheries have tended to encourage the promulgation of fresh
enforcement legislation and even though enforcement takes place on a
flag State basis, indirect enforcement cooperation is encouraged. These
positive outcomes have proved achievable as a consequence of the
provisional nature of the agreements which are without prejudice to final
maritime boundary delimitation.
The joint fisheries zones in East Asia do have significant drawbacks.
A key problem relates to their geographical scope. They are incomplete,
covering only parts of East Asia's maritime space and lack an ecosystem25 The China - Japan agreement was signed on 11 November 1997 and entered into force
on 1 June 2000; the South Korea - Japan agreement entered into force in January 1999; and
the China - South Korea agreement entered into force on 30 June 2001. See S.P. Kim, 'The
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and New Fisheries Agreements in North East Asia',
Marine Policy, 27 (2003), 97-109.
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wide approach. Indeed, there are large "current fishing patterns" zones
where fishing is uncoordinated and unregulated. Another problematic
issue is that there are overlaps between the various zones. Furthermore,
enforcement is on a flag state basis with minimal joint enforcement
envisaged and, crucially, there are no provisions for enforcement against
third parties. The latter issue is especially problematic in the East China
Sea where Taiwan is a party to none of the agreements, yet Taiwanese
fishermen are very active in these waters. It is also worth observing that
the agreements have themselves been a source of controversy, protests
and dispute within the participating countries, often because of their
perceived relationship to sovereignty disputes over islands.
Overall, however, the joint fisheries zones in the East Asia represent
an encouraging migration of rhetoric on cooperation into practical joint
management and cooperative enforcement and information sharing. As
such, these bilateral mechanisms offer potential building blocks for
regional agreement and multilateral approach to ocean management.26
Eleven cooperative mechanisms have therefore been negotiated
throughout the region with a further joint zone currently subject to
negotiations. This demonstrates that there is an abundance of
enthusiasm, experience and capacity in Southeast and East Asia for
cooperative mechanisms.

Cooperative Mechanisms and Maritime Security
How have issues of security, enforcement and criminal jurisdiction been
handled in joint development zones in the absence of delimitation?
Perhaps unsurprisingly, most maritime joint development zones have
been inspired by the desire to gain access to or manage resources,
especially seabed resources. The provisions of such agreements have
therefore been limited in terms of maritime security. However, more
recent, post 9/11, agreements have proved to be more explicit in dealing
with these concerns.
For example, in the agreement establishing a joint zone between
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe, Article 9 establishes a Joint
Authority and lists its functions including the following specific clauses:
26 For a full analysis of these provisional fishery agreements see ibid., 107.
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(h) Controlling the movements into, within and out of the
Zone of vessels, aircraft, structures, equipment and people;
(i) The establishment of safety zones and restricted zones,
consistent with international law, to ensure the safety of
navigation, petroleum activities, fishing activities and other
development activities and the effective management of the
Zone;
(k) The regulation of marine scientific research;
(o) The preservation of the marine environment...
(r) Requesting action by the appropriate authorities of the
States Parties consistent with this Treaty, in respect of the
following matters:
(i) Search and rescue operations in the Zone;
(ii) Deterrence and suppression of terrorist or other
threats to vessels and structures engaged in
development activities in the Zone; and
(iii)

The prevention or remedying of pollution;27

Furthermore, under Article 43 dealing with security and policing in the
Zone it is stated that:
43.1 The States Parties shall...jointly conduct defence or
police activities throughout the Zone...
43.2 If and to the extend that either State Party shall fail to
comply...then without prejudice to any other rights the
other State Party may have, nothing in this Treaty shall
prevent that other State Party from separately carrying on
such activities to such an extent as it considers necessary
or appropriate.
43.3 The States Parties shall consult with each other...

27 'Treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao
Tome and Principe on the Joint Development of Petroleum and other Resources, in
Respect of Areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Two States' (21 February 2001),
Article 9.
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43.4 This article is without prejudice to any other basis for
the conduct of defence or police activities which either State
Party may have under international law.28
Similarly, the Timor Sea Treaty establishing a Joint Petroleum
Development Area between Australia and Timor-Leste contains specific
provisions in respect of both surveillance and security:

Article 18. Surveillance
(a) For the purposes of this Treaty, Australia and East Timor
shall have the right to undertake surveillance activities.
(b) Australia and East Timor shall cooperate on and
coordinate any surveillance activities carried out in
accordance with paragraph (a).
(c) Australia and East Timor shall exchange information
derived from any surveillance activities carried out in
accordance with paragraph (a).

Article 19. Security measures
(a) Australia and East Timor shall exchange information
on likely threats to, or security incidents relating to,
exploration of petroleum resources in the JPDA.
(b) Australia and East Timor shall make arrangements for
responding to security incidents in the JPDA.29
While these provisions are broad indeed they do show how "provisional
arrangements of a practical nature" can address issues other than the
exploitation and management of seabed or living resources. It is
increasingly likely that this will prove the case in the future.
An alternative way to address the issue of maritime security in zones
of overlapping claims to jurisdiction, but one which avoids the need to
enter into a formal agreement establishing a cooperative mechanism
such as a joint zone, is to enter into informal operational arrangements.
28 Ibid., Article 43.
29 'Timor Sea Treaty7 (Dili, 20 May 2002), Articles 18 and 19.
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In circumstances where achieving even a non-prejudicial provisional
arrangement of a practical nature is problematic, practically orientated
operational understandings offer an alternative way forward. In this
context the arrangements in place between the United Kingdom
maritime enforcement authorities and their French and Irish
counterparts for the policing of their respective "grey zones" of
overlapping fisheries zone claims provide an excellent example of what
can be achieved. Close contact is maintained between the operational
units charged with patrolling the respective fisheries zones and they
coordinate amongst themselves as to who will police the grey zones, and
when. Where a vessel is apprehended fishing illegally, they are prosecuted
under the jurisdiction of whichever state's enforcement patrol made the
arrest. In this case cooperation is substantially aided by the fact that
the parties are close allies with longstanding navy-to-navy cooperation
in place and that the relevant rules and regulations are harmonised as
part of the common EU fisheries 'pond'. It must be recognized that the
scenario is substantially different in Southeast and East Asia.
Nonetheless, such engagement at the operational level must be viewed
as highly desirable and an ideal and laudably practical way to help
ensure maritime security and enforcement in overlapping claims areas
even in the absence of any formal agreement among the parties
concerned.

Conclusions
Given the fluid nature of the marine environment and thus the way in
which many marine resources transcend artificial political boundaries,
as well as the transnational nature of many marine activities, it may
seem odd to advocate a system of international maritime boundaries.
Nonetheless, most states seem to prefer unilateral management regimes
and this is reflected in the LOSC. While maritime boundary delimitation
may not necessarily represent the ideal basis for integrated management
of ocean affairs, it does represent the dominant approach adopted by
coastal states to govern maritime rights and responsibilities. On this
basis it can therefore be argued that maritime delimitation is preferable
to broad zones of overlapping claims, competing activities and lack of
coordinated ocean management. A comprehensive network of delimited
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maritime boundaries can therefore provide a clear framework for
maritime surveillance, enforcement activities and thus maritime security.
Where maritime boundary delimitation proves problematic,
however, the LOSC provides for "provisional arrangements of a practical
nature" - maritime joint development zones and cooperative
mechanisms - and this type of approach is increasingly supported by
state practice. Indeed, Southeast and East Asia are leading the way in
terms of applying this type of practical oceans management and conflict
avoidance mechanism and this argues that there is already considerable
practical experience and capacity within the region. This provides hope
that the numerous remaining zones of overlapping claims in the region
can be addressed in a similar manner. The way in which cooperative
mechanisms have been adapted to address security concerns is also a
positive development and a fresh opportunity as well as challenge for
the states concerned.
Although joint zones or similar cooperative mechanisms should
not be entered into lightly, they can be viewed as being preferable to
contested overlapping claims areas. Nonetheless, the practical efficacy
of such cooperative mechanisms, with regard to maritime security or
any other function, is, ultimately, fundamentally dependent on the degree
of genuine cooperation among the parties as well as their joint capacity
to undertake the considerable responsibilities entailed.
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